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Introduction 
Imagine that police officers arrest Robert White after an informant 
bought an ounce of cocaine from him. While searching Robert 
incident to his arrest, the police find his smart phone.1 In order to 
determine if Robert is working with any conspirators to sell the 
cocaine, the officers decide to search the contents of his phone, and 
come across photographs implicating him in a child pornography ring. 
Before trial on the charges of possession and distribution of child 
pornography, Robert moves to suppress the evidence found on his cell 
phone2 because officers searched it without a warrant.3  
 
1. For a definition and brief history of “smartphones,” see William L. Hosch, 
Smartphone, Encyclopedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/ 
EBchecked/topic/1498102/smartphone (last visited Mar. 9, 2013). 
2. This Comment uses the term smart phone to specify the modern cell 
phones defined by Encyclopedia Britannica. Id. When this Comment 
discusses cell phones, the term encompasses both smart phones and 
traditional cell phones, which simply send text messages and make 
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The above situation has become more common due to the 
heightened prevalence of smart phones in the United States.4 As such, 
courts have increasingly been required to determine the legality and 
parameters of cell phone searches—often coming to vastly different 
outcomes.5 Without proper guidance from courts, officers struggle to 
determine whether they may search, when they may search, and what 
information on the phone they may search. This Comment proposes a 
workable standard that should be uniformly followed by courts in 
order to provide guidance to officers as to when they may properly 
search a smart phone incident to arrest. Part I studies the history of 
the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. 
Part II surveys the different pathways lower courts used when 
analyzing cell phone searches. Part III examines two recent Supreme 
Court cases’ effect on the search of smart phones. Part IV defines the 
standard all courts should apply—and officers should follow—in 
determining if a search of a smart phone is lawful under current 
Supreme Court precedent. Overall, this Comment concludes that the 
reasoning set forth in the Supreme Court’s decision of Arizona v. Gant 
protects a smart phone from being searched incident to every arrest.6 
I. History of the Search Incident to Arrest Exception 
The Fourth Amendment states that “[t]he right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”7 
Although the Supreme Court has often stated that warrantless 
searches are per se unreasonable,8 the Court has created many 
 
phone calls without the additional capabilities of a smart phone. The 
discussion of prior case law, in Part II, is an exception to this rule since 
many courts did not distinguish if the cell phone at issue was a smart 
phone or not. 
3. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (stating that 
warrantless searches are per se unreasonable). 
4. See Two Thirds of New Mobile Buyers Now Opting For Smartphones, 
Nielsen (July 12, 2012), http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/online_ 
mobile/two-thirds-of-new-mobile-buyers-now-opting-for-smartphones 
(depicting the substantial growth of smart phones in the market). 
5. See infra Part II. 
6. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
7. U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
8. See, e.g., Gant, 556 U.S. at 338 (stating that “searches conducted 
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or 
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment” 
(quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357)); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 401 
(1985) (same). 
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exceptions.9 Each court to confront the issue of a warrantless cell 
phone search has analyzed the issue utilizing a different framework 
under the search incident to arrest theory of warrantless searches. 
The search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement, 
which has developed through several Supreme Court opinions, permits 
officers to search a person and his effects upon valid arrest in order to 
protect police and to find evidence to use for prosecution. As early as 
1914, the Supreme Court, in dicta, authorized officers “to search the 
person of the accused when legally arrested to discover and seize the 
fruits or evidences of crime.”10 Several years later, the Court 
elaborated on this permission and stated that “[w]hen a man is legally 
arrested for an offense, whatever is found upon his person or in his 
control which it is unlawful for him to have and which may be used 
to prove the offense may be seized and held as evidence in the 
prosecution.”11 Only a few months later, the Court, again in dicta, 
stated that officers may search the place where a lawful arrest is made 
in order to search for evidence and weapons,12 and this was later used 
to uphold the search of a closet pursuant to a lawful arrest.13 In the 
years following the expansion of this policy, the Court swayed 
between permitting full searches of the premises where an arrest 
occurs and invalidating such searches.14 
 
9.  See, e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987) (“It is well 
established that under certain circumstances the police may seize 
evidence in plain view without a warrant.” (quoting Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971))); Carroll v. United States, 267 
U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (“[T]he guaranty of freedom from unreasonable 
searches and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed . . . 
as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a store, 
dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a proper official 
warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, 
wagon or automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practicable 
to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the 
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.”).  
10. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). 
11. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 158 (citing Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392). 
12. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925) (“The right without a 
search warrant contemporaneously to search persons lawfully arrested 
while committing crime and to search the place where the arrest is made 
in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or 
as the means by which it was committed, as well as weapons and other 
things to effect an escape from custody, is not to be doubted.”). 
13. See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927) (“They had a 
right without a warrant contemporaneously to search the place in order 
to find and seize the things used to carry on the criminal enterprise. . . . 
The closet in which liquor and the ledger were found was used as a part 
of the saloon.”). 
14. Compare Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 358 
(1931) (invalidating a search of the arrestee’s office), and United States 
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Finally, in 1969, the Court, in Chimel v. California, clarified its 
position on what searches an officer is permitted to conduct incident 
to arrest.15 In 1965, officers arrested Chimel pursuant to a warrant for 
burglary of a coin shop.16 Upon execution of the arrest warrant, the 
officers sought permission to search his house, which Chimel refused.17 
Officers proceeded to search his entire home anyway, on the basis of 
the lawful arrest, and opened drawers and moved aside items to find 
evidence of the burglary.18 The Court held that  
[w]hen an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to 
search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the 
latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his 
escape. . . . In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting 
officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person 
in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.19  
The Court went on to state that “the area into which an arrestee 
might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of 
course, be governed by a like rule.”20 Pursuant to these twin 
rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation, officers were no 
longer permitted to search the entire premises at which a person was 
arrested—they were limited to searching the arrestee himself and the 
area into which the arrestee might be able to reach. 
In United States v. Robinson, the Court expanded the rule put 
forth in Chimel, holding that officers may search closed containers 
found on a person, or within his control, as a valid search incident 
to arrest.21 Officers arrested Robinson for driving with a revoked 
license and proceeded to search his person.22 The officer conducting 
 
v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 463–65 (1932) (invalidating a search of desk 
drawers and a cabinet), and Trupiana v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 
705 (1948) (holding that officers must secure a search warrant whenever 
practicable and failure to do so renders a search incident to arrest 
invalid), with Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 152–53 (1947) 
(permitting officers to search an entire four-room apartment including 
desk drawers), and United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 60–63 
(1950) (validating a search of the arrestee’s desk, safe, and file cabinets 
since the area was within the possession of the arrestee). 
15. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
16. Id. at 753. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 754. 
19. Id. at 762–63. 
20. Id. at 763. 
21. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
22. Id. at 220–22. 
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the search felt an object in Robinson’s pocket but could not 
determine what the object was, so he reached inside and pulled out 
a cigarette package.23 The officer testified that he was unsure what 
was inside the package, but could ascertain that it was not 
cigarettes, so he opened it to find fourteen capsules of heroin.24 The 
Court held that, “[h]aving in the course of a lawful search come 
upon the crumpled package of cigarettes, he was entitled to inspect 
it.”25 The Court held that it was not necessary to litigate in every 
case whether or not the officers were acting based on the theories of 
officer safety or evidence preservation since searching incident to 
arrest is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.26 
The Court’s holding in Robinson was subsequently used to 
justify a warrantless search of a closed container in an automobile 
incident to arrest. In New York v. Belton, police stopped a vehicle 
for travelling at excessive speed and immediately smelled marijuana 
and saw an envelope on the vehicle’s floor related to marijuana 
use.27 After arresting all four men in the vehicle, the officer searched 
the vehicle.28 The officer found a jacket on the back seat, belonging 
to Belton, and proceeded to unzip the pockets, where he discovered 
cocaine.29 The Court held that police officers may search the 
passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to a lawful arrest and 
in doing so, officers may search any container found therein.30 In a 
footnote, the Court defined a ‘container’ as “any object capable of 
holding another object . . . includ[ing] closed or open glove 
compartments, consoles . . . luggage, boxes, bags, clothing, and the 
like.”31 According to the Court, it is not any reduced expectation of 
privacy that authorizes this search, but instead the lawful arrest 
justifies infringement on an arrestee’s privacy.32 
 
23. Id. at 223. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 236. 
26. Id. at 235. 
27. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 455–56 (1981). 
28. Id. at 456. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 460–61. 
31. Id. at 460–61 n.4. 
32. Id. at 461 (“Such a container may, of course, be searched whether it is 
open or closed, since the justification for the search is not that the 
arrestee has no privacy interest in the container, but that the lawful 
custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the 
arrestee may have.”). 
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II. Lower Courts’ Analyses of Warrantless Cell 
Phone Searches 
Lower courts have come to a variety of conclusions when dealing 
with searches of cell phones incident to arrest. One of the most 
prominent cases examining a search of a cell phone as a search 
incident to arrest is United States v. Finley.33 Police officers 
conducted a valid traffic stop on the van Finley was driving after 
observing an informant buy narcotics from a passenger in the 
vehicle.34 After searching the van and finding additional drug 
paraphernalia, officers arrested both Finley and his passenger.35 Upon 
searching Finley’s person, officers found a cell phone, but did not 
search it until they went to his passenger’s residence, where agents 
were conducting a search pursuant to a prior warrant for the 
residence.36 Several text messages found on Finley’s phone implicated 
him in narcotics trafficking, and after the police confronted Finley 
with these messages, he admitted to distributing marijuana.37 
Although the Fifth Circuit held that Finley had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his phone and its contents, the court upheld 
the search.38 In doing so, the court stated that “[p]olice officers are 
not constrained to search only for weapons or instruments of escape 
on the arrestee’s person; they may also, without any additional 
justification, look for evidence of the arrestee’s crime on his person in 
order to preserve it for use at trial.”39 Since the cell phone was found 
on Finley at the time of his arrest, the court upheld the search, 
finding that the search was comparable to a search of a closed 
container.40 In December 2012, the Fifth Circuit declined to overrule 
Finley in light of recent Supreme Court case law and instead upheld 
the search of a suspect’s cell phone incident to his arrest for intent to 
 
33. United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007). 
34. Id. at 253–54. 
35. Id. at 254. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 254–55. 
38. Id. at 259. 
39. Id. at 259–60. 
40. Id. at 260 (“The permissible scope of a search incident to a lawful 
arrest extends to containers found on the arrestee’s person.” (citing 
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460–61 (1981); United States v. 
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 223–24 (1973))). 
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distribute and possess marijuana, again analogizing a cell phone to a 
container.41 
A year after Finley, in United States v. Young, the Fourth Circuit 
followed the Fifth Circuit’s lead and upheld the search of a suspect’s 
cell phone incident to his lawful arrest on the theory of preserving 
evidence.42 Young’s girlfriend consented to a search of her apartment 
after informing police of drug activities on its premises.43 Two days 
later, the police returned and arrested Young and an accomplice.44 
Upon searching Young’s person, officers found a cell phone, searched 
its text messages without a warrant, and wrote down the contents.45 
The court found that “officers had no way of knowing whether the 
text messages would automatically delete themselves or be preserved,” 
therefore permitting a search to occur incident to arrest.46 In United 
States v. Murphy, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed this holding and 
rejected arguments that the storage capacity of a phone affects 
whether police may search a phone incident to arrest.47 
But not all courts have followed the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit. 
For instance, the Northern District of California disagreed with Finley, 
and found a cell phone search to be impermissible as a search incident to 
arrest. In United States v. Park, defendant Park was arrested after 
officers observed other defendants leave items at an apartment that Park 
and an accomplice then entered.48 Pursuant to a search warrant, the 
officers entered the apartment and observed evidence of marijuana 
cultivation.49 After being transported to the police station, all defendants 
were booked and their property, including their cell phones, was placed 
into envelopes for safekeeping.50 In an attempt to find fellow conspirators, 
 
41. United States v. Rodriguez, 702 F.3d 206, 210 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding 
that Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), does not “disturb[ ]” the 
Fifth Circuit’s holding in Finley). 
42. United States v. Young, 278 F. App’x 242, 245–46 (4th Cir. 2008) (per 
curiam) (“[B]ased upon . . . the Fifth Circuit’s like conclusion, and the 
manifest need of the officers to preserve evidence, we conclude that the 
officers permissibly accessed and copied the text messages on the phone 
during the search incident to arrest” (citing Finley, 477 F.3d at 259–
60)). 
43. Id. at 244. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 245. 
47. United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 411 (4th Cir. 2009).  
48. United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *1 (N.D. 
Cal. May 23, 2007). 
49. Id. at *1–2. 
50. Id. at *2.  
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the officers searched the phones’ address books.51 The court concluded 
that a modern cell phone is similar to a laptop computer rather than the 
address books and pagers often found on a person incident to arrest, due 
to the phone’s “capacity for storing immense amounts of private 
information.”52 Since the officers examined the phones long after the 
initial arrest, the court found that the search of the cell phone was 
beyond the rationales of ensuring police safety and preserving evidence 
and was therefore purely investigatory.53 The court held that officers 
were lawfully permitted to seize the cell phones incident to arrest but 
were required to obtain a warrant in order to search the phones’ contents 
“due to the quantity and quality of information that can be stored on a 
cellular phone.”54 
In State v. Smith, the Ohio Supreme Court agreed with Park’s 
conclusion that when the search of a cell phone fails to further the 
twin justifications of officer safety and preservation of evidence, the 
evidence must be suppressed.55 But it disagreed with Park’s rationale 
that cell phones are similar to laptops, finding that modern cell 
phones are still phones, and thus distinguishable from laptops.56 
Smith’s arrest stemmed from the confession of a drug user who 
claimed Smith was her dealer.57 Upon his arrest, officers found and 
searched Smith’s cell phone to examine the call records and phone 
numbers to confirm the buyer’s story.58 The court specifically held 
that cell phones are not analogous to closed containers and an officer 
must obtain a warrant, even when searching incident to arrest, prior 
to searching a cell phone’s contents.59 
At least one court has reasoned that a search incident to arrest, 
when based on the premise of preserving evidence, must arise from a 
desire to preserve evidence of the specific crime for which the suspect 
 
51. Id. at *3–5. The record is unclear if the search was done prior to 
booking or after, but it was clear that the search was done at the 
station—over an hour after the arrest. Id. 
52. Id. at *8. The court continued to state that “a search of [a laptop is] 
substantially more intrusive than a search of the contents of a lunchbox 
or other tangible object.” Id. (quoting United States v. Arnold, 454 F. 
Supp. 2d 999, 1003 (C.D. Cal. 2006)). 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at *9. 
55. State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949 (Ohio 2009). 
56. Id. at 955. 
57. Id. at 950. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 955. 
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is being arrested.60 In United States v. Quintana, police arrested 
Quintana for driving with a suspended license.61 While legally 
searching the vehicle with Quintana’s consent, the officer smelled 
marijuana but found no evidence of marijuana in the vehicle.62 
Officers then searched Quintana’s phone in order to find evidence to 
prove his marijuana use.63 After finding a picture of a marijuana grow 
house on the phone, officers proceeded to the address listed on 
Quintana’s license, finding further evidence of marijuana cultivation.64 
The court stated that since the suspect was arrested for driving with 
a suspended license the officer was not attempting to preserve 
evidence of the crime and he was unjustified in his warrantless search 
of the cell phone.65 The court suppressed the photograph and further 
evidence found at Quintana’s home.66 
The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Flores-Lopez, upheld the 
search of a cell phone when the search was conducted solely to find 
the phone’s number as a valid search incident to arrest.67 Flores-Lopez 
was arrested after an informant overheard a conversation between 
him and another dealer that methamphetamines would be delivered to 
a garage at a particular time.68 After the drugs arrived, officers 
arrested Flores-Lopez and his associate and proceeded to search both 
him and the vehicle in which Flores-Lopez had brought the drugs.69 
Officers found one cell phone on Flores-Lopez and two more in his 
truck.70 Subsequently, police officers searched each cell phone to find 
its telephone number, which the officers then used to subpoena the 
call history from the provider, including the phone call overheard by 
the informant.71 The court found that even a negligible risk that 
evidence on the phone could be wiped validated searches of smart 
phones, “provided it’s no more invasive than, say, a frisk, or the 
 
60. United States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1300 (M.D. Fla. 
2009). 
61. Id. at 1295. 
62. Id.  
63. Id. at 1295–96. 
64. Id. at 1296. 
65. Id. at 1300 (“This type of search is not justified by the twin rationales 
of Chimel and pushes the search-incident-to arrest doctrine beyond its 
limits.”). 
66. Id. at 1306. 
67. United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 810 (7th Cir. 2012). 
68. Id. at 804. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
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search of a conventional container, such as Robinson’s cigarette pack, 
in which heroin was found.”72 Judge Posner, writing for the court, 
declined to determine what level of risk would be required to justify a 
more invasive search since those facts were not before the court.73 
As the above cases illustrate, lower courts cannot reach a 
unanimous conclusion on how to treat cell phone searches incident to 
arrest. Lower courts have variously permitted police officers to search 
any cell phone incident to arrest, prohibited police officers from 
searching any phone without a warrant, or applied a standard in 
between. As such, police officers struggle to determine which phones 
they may legally search under the Fourth Amendment. This 
Comment posits that a workable standard based on Supreme Court 
precedent already exists. 
III. How Gant and Jones Affect Smart Phones 
To date, the Supreme Court has never decided a case involving 
the search of a smart phone, whether incident to arrest or otherwise. 
In fact, the Court’s examination of developing technologies has been 
limited to a few cases involving technologies such as wiretapping, 
aerial photography, heat-sensing technology, and most recently a GPS 
sensor.74 The closest the Supreme Court has come to examining a 
search of a smart phone was examining the legality of searching an 
employee’s text messages through a city-owned pager.75 The Supreme 
Court decided that the search of the pager was valid on the 
exceedingly narrow grounds that the special needs of the workplace 
justified a warrantless search.76 The Court expressly declined to 
examine whether the defendant’s privacy expectations were implicated 
by the search or whether any other exceptions to the warrant 
requirement permitted the search.77 But two of the Court’s recent 
decisions—Arizona v. Gant 78 and United States v. Jones 79—may shed 
 
72. Id. at 809. 
73. Id. at 810. 
74. See Daniel T. Pesciotta, Note, I’m Not Dead Yet: Katz, Jones, and the 
Fourth Amendment in the 21st Century, 63 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 187 
(2012) (examining Supreme Court cases involving both technology and 
the Fourth Amendment and concluding that the Katz reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test is still relevant in today’s technologically 
advanced society). 
75. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010). 
76. Id. at 2630. 
77. Id. at 2631. 
78. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
79. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
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light upon what standard the Court would apply to searches of smart 
phones incident to a lawful arrest. 
A. Does Gant Affect Warrantless Searches Outside Vehicles? 
In the 2009 decision Arizona v. Gant, the Supreme Court, per 
Justice Stevens, held that officers may not search a suspect’s vehicle 
incident to his arrest when the suspect is handcuffed and secured inside 
a police car.80 Officers arrested Gant for driving with a suspended 
license and proceeded to handcuff and lock him in the back of the 
police car.81 Once Gant was secure, officers searched his vehicle and 
discovered a bag of cocaine.82 Gant opposed the introduction of the 
cocaine as evidence at his trial, arguing that the search failed to meet 
the original justifications for the search incident to arrest doctrine: 
officer safety and evidence preservation.83 The Court held that 
[a] rule that gives police the power to conduct such a search 
whenever an individual is caught committing a traffic offense, 
when there is no basis for believing evidence of the offense 
might be found in the vehicle, creates a serious and recurring 
threat to the privacy of countless individuals.84  
Although the Court was speaking of the privacy interest owners 
have in their vehicles, the same argument could be made for the 
privacy interest in one’s cell phone. The Court’s statement in Gant 
appears to apply to any situation in which officers attempt to conduct 
a broad search of a suspect’s person and effects, despite his 
expectation of privacy, simply because the suspect has been arrested. 
Unanimously, each court to expressly examine the issue has found 
that a suspect has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his phone 
and its contents,85 and the Supreme Court should agree and find an 
 
80. Gant, 556 U.S. at 351 (2009). 
81. Id. at 336. 
82. Id. 
83. Id.  
84. Id. at 345. 
85. See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259 (5th Cir. 2007) (“In 
these circumstances, we conclude that Finley had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the call records and text messages on the cell 
phone.”); United States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1299 (M.D. 
Fla. 2009) (“An owner of a cell phone generally has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the electronic data stored on the phone.”); 
United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *9 (N.D. 
Cal. May 23, 2007) (“[D]ue to the quantity and quality of information 
that can be stored on a cellular phone, a cellular phone should not be 
characterized as an element of individual’s clothing or person, but rather 
as a ‘possession[ ] within an arrestee’s immediate control [that has] 
fourth amendment protection at the station house.’ ” (alteration in 
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expectation of privacy to which Gant’s holding would apply. 
Therefore, if the Supreme Court were to agree that there is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in a cell phone and its contents, it 
would find that a rule permitting the search of any cell phone incident 
to arrest would be a gross invasion of privacy, and thus 
unconstitutional. 
In Gant, the Court explicitly returned to the reasoning put forth 
in Chimel, stating that searches incident to arrest are limited to the 
area within the arrestee’s immediate control, meaning the area from 
which he might obtain a weapon or destroy evidence.86 But the Court 
found that “circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a 
search incident to a lawful arrest when it is ‘reasonable to believe 
evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found.’ ”87 Although 
this permission to search based on reasonable belief evidence will be 
found does not stem from Chimel itself, the Court believed that the 
lesser privacy interest in the vehicle permitted a search incident to 
arrest to occur. Similarly, circumstances unique to smart phones 
permit searches incident to arrest in limited circumstances.88 
B. Does Jones Affect Smart Phone Searches? 
In United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the 
traditional trespass theory of the Fourth Amendment.89 The Court 
was confronted with the issue of whether evidence must be suppressed 
when officers placed a GPS tracking device on a suspect’s vehicle in 
order to observe his movements over a four-week period.90 Although 
the government had initially obtained a warrant, the officers failed to 
comply with its requirements, placing the device on the vehicle 
outside the issuing court’s jurisdiction and outside the timeframe 
permitted by the court.91 The government conceded the failure to 
comply and instead argued that no warrant was required in this 
 
original) (quoting United States v. Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285, 1290 
(9th Cir. 1981))); State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 955 (Ohio 2009) 
(“[B]ecause an individual has a privacy interest in the contents of a cell 
phone that goes beyond the privacy interest in an address book or 
pager, an officer may not conduct a search of a cell phone’s contents 
incident to a lawful arrest without first obtaining a warrant.”). 
86. Gant, 556 U.S. at 339. 
87. Id. at 343 (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (determining that a vehicle’s reduced expectation 
of privacy permits a broader search incident to arrest)). 
88. See Part IV, infra. 
89. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
90. Id. at 948. 
91. Id.  
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case.92 The Court held that the government’s warrantless trespass 
onto a citizen’s private property is considered a search.93 Although 
many recent cases focused solely on whether a suspect had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the item being searched, the 
Court maintained that the trespass theory and reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy theory are not mutually exclusive.94 Since the 
government “physically intrud[ed] on a constitutionally protected 
area” the Court invalidated the search and ordered the evidence 
suppressed.95 Every court to address the issue of warrantless searches 
of cell phones has found a search occurred, but the Jones opinion has 
stirred debate as to whether officers can use a smart phone’s internal 
GPS capabilities to track a suspect.96 
In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor questioned if the 
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test could continue to provide 
guidance for courts in the wake of new technological advances. 
Sotomayor stated that “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise 
that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”97 In the current 
digital age, smart phone users disclose the numbers they call, the 
websites they visit, and the people to whom they send e-mails to their 
Internet service providers,98 and even where they bank may be 
shared.99 Justice Sotomayor “would not assume that all information 
 
92. Id. at 948 n.1. 
93. Id. at 949 (“The Government physically occupied private property for 
the purpose of obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a 
physical intrusion would have been considered a ‘search’ within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.”). 
94. Id. at 952 (“[T]he Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been 
added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.”) 
(emphasis in original); see also id. at 954–55 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(“[E]ven in the absence of a trespass, ‘a Fourth Amendment search 
occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy 
that society recognizes as reasonable.’ ” (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 
533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001))). 
95. Id. at 950 n.3 (majority opinion). 
96. See, e.g., Jeremy H. Rothstein, Note, Track Me Maybe: The Fourth 
Amendment and the Use of Cell Phone Tracking to Facilitate Arrest, 81 
Fordham L. Rev. 489 (2012); Sara E. Silva, Oh, the Places You’ve 
Been! Preserving Privacy in a Cellular Age, Bos. B.J., (Sept. 12, 2012), 
http://bostonbarjournal.com/2012/09/12/oh-the-places-youve-been-
preserving-privacy-in-a-cellular-age/. 
97. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
98. Id. 
99. See Shane Kite, The Five Best Mobile Banking Apps Now, Am. Banker 
(October 1, 2010), http://www.americanbanker.com/btn/23_10/the-
five-best-mobile-apps-now-1026278-1.html. Not only do people access 
their bank on their cell phones, they can also pay for purchases and 
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voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited 
purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment 
protection.”100 Under this theory, individuals should not have less of 
an expectation of privacy in their smart phones simply due to the 
amount of information that is shared with the cell phone company or 
other third parties. 
IV. Warrantless Smart Phone Searches Are 
Permissible in Limited Circumstances 
Many commentators have spent countless pages arguing that 
Chimel should not apply to the search of a cell phone,101 and the 
application of Gant to smart phone searches only clarifies that 
warrantless searches may not be upheld as searches incident to arrest. 
Gant illustrates the Court’s resolve to return to the initial rationales 
behind the search incident to arrest doctrine. Jones, especially 
Sotomayor’s concurrence, explains that without a warrant the 
government cannot intrude into a constitutionally protected area, and 
that the current era of technological advances mandates that smart 
phone users be given Fourth Amendment protection consonant with 
at least a minimum of an expectation of privacy.  
 
accept credit card payments. See also Farnoosh Torabi, Mobile Banking: 
6 Free Apps, CBS News (May 16, 2011, 7:49 AM), http://www. 
cbsnews.com/8301-505144_162-41541902/mobile-banking-6-free-apps. 
100. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Privacy is not a 
discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all. Those who 
disclose certain facts to a bank or phone company for a limited business 
purpose need not assume that this information will be released to other 
persons for other purposes.” (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 
749 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting))). 
101. See, e.g., Charles E. MacLean, But, Your Honor, A Cell Phone is not a 
Cigarette Pack: An Immodest Call for a Return to the Chimel 
Justifications for Cell Phone Memory Searches Incident to Lawful 
Arrest, 6 Fed. Cts. L. Rev. 37, 38 (2012) (arguing that cell phones are 
not like cigarette packs, pagers, wallets, or address books simply because 
they are “likewise small, carried in pockets, and can contain personal 
information”); see also Eunice Park, Traffic Ticket Reasonable, Cell 
Phone Search Not: Applying the Search-Incident-to-Arrest Exception to 
the Cell Phone as “Hybrid”, 60 Drake L. Rev. 429, 494 (2012) (“[L]aw 
enforcement officers may search the contents of a cell phone seized 
incident to a valid custodial arrest if the contents are reasonably likely 
to yield evidence related to arrest, with a presumption that text 
messages, e-mail logs, and call logs are searchable. Law enforcement 
officers may search other reasonably related contents when an exigency 
exists regarding safety.”). But see Adam M. Gershowitz, Password 
Protected? Can a Password Save Your Cell Phone From a Search 
Incident to Arrest?, 96 Iowa L. Rev. 1125, 1174 (2011) (arguing that 
even a password-protected cell phone may be searched incident to arrest 
without a warrant). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 3·2013 
Limit Warrantless Smart Phone Searches 
957 
A. A Cell Phone Is Not a Container 
New York v. Belton held that officers are permitted to search 
containers found within an arrestee’s control.102 And several courts 
have specifically held that cell phones should be considered 
containers, thereby permitting them to be searched incident to 
arrest.103 On the other hand, several courts have determined that cell 
phones are not analogous to containers.104 This is the better path—
due to the vast amounts of data contained in a phone, and the 
phone’s inability to hold tangible items, courts should find that cell 
phones are not analogous to ‘containers.’  
As noted in State v. Smith, the Supreme Court specifically stated 
in Belton that the definition of “container” includes only those objects 
that may hold a physical object within it.105 Additionally, the general 
definition of containers does not encompass cell phones because a cell 
phone is not “a receptacle . . . for holding goods.”106 Cell phones are 
generally small devices with no space to hold another physical object 
inside. The containers contemplated by the Supreme Court included 
such items as a cigarette pack in Robinson 107 and a jacket in Belton.108 
A cigarette pack or jacket cannot compare with the sheer amount of 
data found on today’s smart phones, including bank records and 
personal documents that police would normally need a warrant to 
access. Unless the Court expands its legal definition of containers, 
lower courts should find that cell phones are not analogous to 
containers. 
Additionally, the Court permitted the search of Robinson’s 
cigarette pack because the officer testified that he could not determine 
the contents.109 Police officers know, however, that smart phones 
 
102. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981). 
103. See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(defendant conceded that the cell phone was analogous to a container); 
People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 505 (Cal. 2011) (likening a cell phone to 
Robinson’s cigarette package). 
104. See, e.g., United States v. Park, No. CR 05–375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, 
at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007) (“[C]ellular phones should be considered 
‘possessions within an arrestee’s immediate control’ and not part of ‘the 
person’ ”.); State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 954 (Ohio 2009) (same). 
105. Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 954 (“ ‘Container’ here denotes any object capable 
of holding another object.” (citing Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 n.4)). 
106. Container, Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/container (last visited Feb. 8, 2013). 
107. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
108. Belton, 453 U.S. at 454. 
109. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 223. 
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contain information that is not “intrinsically dangerous.”110 Since 
officers know the item likely poses no risk of harm, and the item is 
not analogous to the Supreme Court’s “container,” officers should not 
be permitted to search smart phones incident to arrest. This 
Comment acknowledges that some commentators argue that the data 
inside the cell phone is analogous to the physical objects held in 
containers, since it is simply electronic information.111 But this 
Comment emphasizes the cases in which courts specifically held that 
the vast amounts of data on a phone differentiate it from traditional 
containers.112 This Comment posits that Gant should control and 
officers should only be permitted to search a smart phone when they 
have reasonable suspicion that the smart phone contains evidence of 
the crime of arrest. 
B. Smart Phones Deserve Privacy Equaling Computers 
Commentators often compare smart phones to computers113 and 
the differences between the two are becoming fewer with each passing 
year. Most courts addressing the issue have found that computers 
have a heightened expectation of privacy and require police to obtain 
a specific warrant for the computer prior to searching its contents.114 
According to courts, “analogizing computers to other physical objects 
when applying Fourth Amendment law is not an exact fit because 
computers hold so much personal and sensitive information touching 
on many private aspects of life.”115 
With each passing year “the line between cell phones and personal 
computers has grown increasingly blurry.”116 Today, both smart 
phones and computers are exceedingly mobile devices. Consumers can 
 
110. Ben E. Stewart, Note, Cell Phone Searches Incident to Arrest: A New 
Standard Based on Arizona v. Gant, 99 Ky. L.J. 579, 592 (2011). 
111. Byron Kish, Comment, Cellphone Searches: Works Like a Computer, 
Protected Like a Pager?, 60 Cath. U. L. Rev. 445, 466–67 (2011). 
112. E.g., United States v. Park, No. CR 05–375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8 
(N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007). 
113. Park, supra note 101, at 478; Stewart, supra note 110, at 593; Bryan 
Andrew Stillwagon, Bringing An End to Warrantless Cell Phone 
Searches, 42 Ga. L. Rev. 1165, 1201 (2008).  
114. See, e.g., United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 986 (10th Cir. 2001) 
(holding that search warrants for computers must clearly define the 
information being sought on the computer). 
115. United States v. Lucas, 640 F.3d 168, 178 (6th Cir. 2011); see also 
United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999) (“Relying 
on analogies to closed containers or file cabinets may lead courts to 
oversimplify a complex area of Fourth Amendment doctrines and ignore 
the realities of massive modern computer storage.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
116. Park, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8. 
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purchase netbooks117 or tablets,118 which can fit into a purse or small 
backpack and contain many of the same capabilities as laptop 
computers.119 Today, laptops can download programming “which 
includes voice, video, and instant message capabilities” similar to that 
used in cell phones.120 Voice-Over-Internet Protocol was created to 
replace telephone networks and permits computers to call other 
computers, or even telephones.121 Cloud computing software permits 
users to access their data through the Internet no matter what 
technology they are using.122 With cloud computing software, a 
consumer can carry every file from their computer with them on their 
smart phone. Lastly, although courts seem willing to grant greater 
protections to computers, a computer could be wiped just as a smart 
phone may.123 Since the differences between smart phones and 
personal computers are becoming increasingly fewer, courts should 
recognize that smart phones contain the same expectations of privacy 
as computers and treat warrantless searches of smart phones in the 
same manner. Therefore, courts should require reasonable suspicion in 
the particular parts of the phone being searched. 
C. Limited Exigency Created by Remote Wiping 
That a smart phone could be remotely deleted does create a 
minor exigency, but not to the extent that every smart phone can be 
 
117. Netbook, Encyclopedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/ 
EBchecked/topic/1498289/netbook (last visited Mar. 9, 2013). 
118. Tablet Computer, Encyclopedia Britannica, http://www.britannica. 
com/EBchecked/topic/1740658/tablet-computer (last visited Mar. 9, 2013). 
119. The differences between a tablet computer and a smart phone are 
continually diminishing, and soon there may be no difference at all. See, 
e.g., Michael A. Prospero, Living (Really) Large, Laptop Magazine, 
May 2012, at 44 (describing a cell phone, the Samsung Galaxy Note, 
with the full capabilities of a tablet computer); Kevin C. Tofel, Asus 
PadFone 2 is a Modular Phone and Tablet Combo, Gigaom (Oct. 16, 
2012, 12:27 PM), http://gigaom.com/mobile/asus-padfone-2-is-a-modular-
phone-and-tablet-combo (describing a tablet powered by a cell phone).  
120. Skype, Encyclopedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/ 
topic/1516582/Skype (last visited Mar. 9, 2013). 
121. Id. 
122. Cloud Computing, Encyclopedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/ 
EBchecked/topic/1483678/cloud-computing (last visited Mar. 9, 2013); 
see also Sara J. Kohls, Note, Searching the Clouds: Why Law 
Enforcement Officials Need to Get Their Heads Out of the Cloud and 
Obtain a Warrant Before Accessing a Cloud Network Account, 4 Case 
W. Res. J.L. Tech. & Internet 169 (2012) (describing cloud 
computing, why people use it, and whether service providers may access 
those files). 
123. Remote Delete Laptop Data for Enterprise, Druva, http://www. 
druva.com/safepoint/remote-delete (last visited Mar. 9, 2013). 
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searched by officers. Although courts have found that the risk of 
remote wiping permits searching cell phones incident to arrest,124 the 
data wiped may still be available for officers to find at a later date. 
Thus, searching a cell phone incident to arrest is not be required. 
Remote wiping “can reset a mobile phone to the factory default 
condition.”125 According to law enforcement, an arrestee’s accomplices 
may be able to wipe the phone prior to officers obtaining a search 
warrant.126 “However, no data removal process leaves a mobile device 
as free from residual data as when it’s new. Recovery of data from a 
mobile device may still be possible using sophisticated tools.”127 
Although it may be expensive to obtain the sophisticated tools 
necessary to access the removed data, such tools reduce the exigency 
created by remote wiping technologies. 
Alternatively, officers may prevent a remote wipe from occurring 
by taking simple steps to protect the phone. For example, most 
remote wipe technology requires the smart phone to be powered on 
and officers could simply remove the battery from the device, or 
power down the phone, as they await a warrant.128 Additionally, 
inexpensive devices called Faraday enclosures prevent the remote wipe 
signal from reaching the phone.129 Faraday enclosures shield their  
124. See United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(finding that it is “conceivable” for confederates to wipe data from a cell 
phone before the government could obtain a search warrant); United 
States v. Salgado, No. 1:09–CR–454–CAP–ECS–5, 2010 WL 3062440, at 
*4 (N.D. Ga. June 12, 2010) (“At the time the cellular phone came into 
[police] possession the data on the phone could have been altered, erased, 
or deleted remotely.”); see also United States v. Young, 278 F. App’x 242, 
245–46 (4th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (finding that officers must search the 
phone immediately because text messages can be deleted). 
125. Remote Device Wipe, Microsoft Exchange Server, http://technet. 
microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb124591.aspx (last modified Sept. 19, 
2012); see also iPhone, Apple, http://www.apple.com/iphone/ 
built-in-apps/find-my-iphone.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2013) (explaining 
that an iPhone owner can “initiate a remote wipe to delete [their] 
personal data and restore [the phone] to its factory settings”). 
126. Ben Grubb, Remote Wiping Thwarts Secret Service, ZDNet (May 18, 
2010, 4:43 GMT), http://www.zdnet.com/remote-wiping-thwarts-secret-
service-1339303239; see also Park, supra note 101, at 493 (“As 
consumers, and criminals in particular, become more skillful in their use 
of smart phones, they will more frequently take advantage of the remote 
wipe or automatic deletion feature to banish incriminating data from 
their phones.”). 
127. Remote Device Wipe, Microsoft Exchange Server, http://technet. 
microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb124591.aspx (last modified Sept. 19, 2012). 
128. See Grubb, supra note 126; see also Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d at 808 
(“Without power a cell phone won’t be connected to the phone network 
and so remote wiping will be impossible.”). 
129. MacLean, supra note 101, at 50. 
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contents from electromagnetic radiation and effectively prevent cell 
phone signals from reaching a phone held inside, therefore eliminating 
the risk of losing evidence.130 
In today’s digital age, the information stored on a smart phone is 
often stored in multiple places, and wiping the phone would not 
destroy the actual data sought by officers.131 Smart phones include 
contacts, calendars, email accounts, and more,132 and such information 
is often stored on servers and not solely on the phone.133 If the officers 
are unable to prevent the smart phone’s contents from being wiped, 
they may seek a warrant to search the servers just as they may have 
done for the phone itself. In fact, the Supreme Court has already held 
that there is no expectation of privacy in the numbers called,134 and 
therefore officers could quickly subpoena the phone company 
requesting the call logs from the phone. 
Although remote wipe technology does create a risk that evidence 
may be deleted, the data itself may still be accessible at a later time. 
Since the data may still be accessible, courts should not find that 
searches incident to arrest are required due to the risks posed in 
waiting for a warrant. 
D. Setting a Standard 
The standard set out in Gant for searches of motor vehicles 
incident to arrest135 should be applied to smart phones as well. 
Consumers possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in their phones 
and, without an exception to the warrant requirement, any evidence 
 
130. Id. 
131. See Thomas Porter, The Fallacy of Remote Wiping, ZDNet (July 12, 
2012, 1:55 PM, GMT), http://www.zdnet.com/the-fallacy-of-remote-
wiping-7000000611 (‘‘ ‘You nuked my entire device?’ That’s OK. I 
replicated all of the important stuff to Facebook, several different cloud 
storage providers and my home computer using Google +, Evernote, 
Pocket, Delicious, Direct USB, etc.”). 
132. William L. Hosch, Smartphone, Encyclopedia Britannica, http://www. 
britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1498102/smartphone (last visited Mar. 9, 
2013). 
133. Cloud Computing, supra note 122. One example of such storage is 
Apple’s cloud storage, “iCloud.” See also iCloud, Apple, http:// 
www.apple.com/icloud (last visited Mar. 9, 2013) (“iCloud does more 
than store your content—it lets you access your music, photos, calendars, 
contacts, documents, and more, from whatever device you’re on.”). 
134. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979). 
135. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009) (holding that “a vehicle 
search incident to a recent occupant's arrest after the arrestee has been 
secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle” is not authorized, 
but that “circumstances unique to the automobile context justify a 
search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of 
the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle”). 
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seized must be suppressed. “While no particularized suspicion is 
required for a search incident to arrest, there must be, at a minimum, 
the possibility of destruction of evidence or a threat to an officer’s 
safety.”136 But due to the vast amounts of data found on smart 
phones, officers should be required to limit their searches to those 
areas of the phone that might contain relevant evidence.137 
At least one commentator has argued that officers are sometimes 
searching for the telephone numbers of co-conspirators, which may 
change prior to the officers being able to obtain a warrant.138 In this 
type of situation, however, Gant would permit a search of the phone’s 
contacts since it is reasonable to assume that evidence would be found 
on the phone. This Comment need not set a specific standard for this 
type of exigency because the Gant standard would already permit a 
valid search to occur. 
Conclusion 
Although courts have been left to analyze warrantless smart 
phone searches incident to arrest without guidance from the Supreme 
Court, recent cases clarify the standard that should be applied. 
Following the Court’s decision in Arizona v. Gant,139 courts should 
return to the twin justifications from Chimel v. California.140 In order 
to permit a search incident to arrest of a defendant’s smart phone, 
police should determine if it was reasonable to believe evidence related 
to the arrest would be found on the phone prior to the search. 
Although officers will not be permitted to search smart phones 
incident to every arrest, the specific circumstances surrounding an 
arrest may implicate the reasonable belief necessary to permit a 
search. In the hypothetical discussed in the Introduction to this 
Comment, officers were not aware of any co-conspirators working 
with White, so it would be unreasonable to search his phone and the 
 
136. Stewart, supra note 110, at 593 (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 
752, 763 (1969)). 
137. This standard would be similar to that required in searches of 
computers, even pursuant to a warrant. See United States v. Carey, 172 
F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999) (requiring officers to sort the various 
documents found on a computer and if the officer comes across 
intermingled documents, the officer should request a new warrant 
covering the new documents). 
138. See Daniel K. Gelb, US v. Flores-Lopez: Does the Phone Booth Now 
Reside Inside the Phone?, 36 Champion 18, 19 (May 2012) (explaining 
that co-conspirators may replace their SIM cards each day, therefore 
obtaining new phone numbers each time, which creates an exigency to 
obtain phone numbers before they change). 
139. Gant, 556 U.S. 332. 
140. Chimel, 395 U.S. 752. 
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evidence must be suppressed. Even if officers held a reasonable 
suspicion that White’s phone contained contact information for his  
co-conspirators, the search would be limited to the phone’s contact 
list and recent calls—searching the phone’s photographs would be 
impermissible. 
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